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It 8eems, however, that the soundest procedure would be to
rely upon a direct 3212 motion in such situations until the
legislature provides a specific provision by which the defendant
can speed the determination of 3211 defenses.
CPLR 3211(e).: Jurisdictional defense raised in amended answer
relates back to time of original answer.
In Blatz v. Benschine,88 defendant raised the defense of lack
of personal jurisdiction,8 9 not in his original answer, but in his
responsive pleadings to plaintiff's amended complaint. The Supreme
Court, Queens County, ruled that the defense interposed was
timely.90 The court reasoned: since plaintiff decided to serve,
as a matter of right, an amended complaint, defendant was forced
to respond, also as a matter of course, with amended pleadings
which contained the CPLR 3211 (a) (8) defense. The amendment
was deemed to relate back to the time of service of the original
answer, therefore, defendant's assertion of the jurisdictional defense
was timely.
It is significant to note that the court in the present case
allowed the interposition of the defense as a matter of right, and
not as a matter of its discretion. Thus, the plaintiff who elects
to amend his complaint may then be faced with a jurisdictional
defense.
CPLR 3213.: Summary judgment on conditional instrument denied.
CPLR 3213 provides that "[w]hen an action is based upon a
judgment or instrument for the payment of money only, the plaintiff
may serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary
judgment . . . in lieu of a complaint."

The statute was con-

ceived in an effort to provide a speedy and effective means of
securing a judgment on claims presumptively meritorious where
a formal complaint would be superfluous and the resulting delay
needless. 1
In Baker v. Gundermann,9 2 the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment was based on two written instruments. The first failed
to come within the purview of the statute as an "instrument for
8 53 Misc. 2d 352, 278 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
89 CPLR 3211(a) (8).
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Misc. 2d at 354, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 535.

CPLR 3211(e) provides:

"An objection based upon a ground specified in paragraphs eight or nine
of subdivision (a) is waived if a party . . . does not raise 'such objection
in the responsive pleading."
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9252 Misc. 2d 639, 276 N.Y.S2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
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the payment of money only." - It consisted of a letter signed by
the defendants assuring restitution to the plaintiff should certain
stock certificates lent by him to the defendants not be returned
safely. What was obviously fatal to the plaintiff's motion was the
fact that the defendants' liability pursuant to this first letter was
conditional, i.e., it would not mature until there was a showing
of a breach on the part of the defendants in returning the
certificates. A substantial question of fact appeared unanswered
and, accordingly, it required more complete pleadings.
No similar question was visible in the second writing. 'Again
signed by the defendants, this letter acknowledged receipt of
$15,000 as a loan at four percent per annum. Here the defendants'
liability was unconditional and, accordingly,
the procedure of
93
CPLR 3213 was available to the plaintiff.
Since Louis Sherry Ice Cream Co. v. Kroggel,94 where the
court upheld a customer's loan receipt as an "instrument for the
payment of money" within the ambit of CPLR 3213, the courts
have generally exhibited a willingness to afford substantial weight
to the instrument itself.9 5 It appears, however, that because of
the summariness of CPLR 3213, the courts are determined to
filter 3213 motions, rejecting all with questionable facts, so that
the presumption of merit is conclusive.
CPLR 3216: Counterclaim dismissed for general delay.
Prior to the recent amendment of CPLR 3216, the appellate
division, first department, in Kippen & Company v. Stahl,"
reversed the lower court and ruled that defendant's counterclaim
should be dismissed where the record revealed that defendant
had delayed some thirty-two months in its prosecution.
The instant case has several unusual aspects. It appears to
be the first time that a New York court has dismissed a counterclaim on the ground of general delay. Though the nature of the
counterclaim in the present case is unknown, a feeling of bewilderment is elicited by the court's ruling, since it is usual for the
prosecution of a counterclaim to await the trial of the main action.
0 Compare Gilston v. Ullman, 45 Misc. 2d 6, 255 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Dist.
Ct. Nassau County 1965), with Channel Excavators v. Amato Trucking
Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 429, 264 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
9442 Misc. 2d 21, 245 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963),
where
it was held that such an instrument need not be negotiable.
D5 Supra note 93. See Winter v. Star Factors, Inc., (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1964, p. 18, col. 6, wherein a letter agreement
.which provided .for the honoring of credit cards was held to be an
"instrument for the payment of money only."
927 App. Div. 2d 650, 276 N.Y.S2d 435 (Ist Dep't 1967).
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